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Abstract 
Debate on the need for new antidiscrimination laws to address religious discrimination 
continues in Australia, notwithstanding the stalling of a controversial federal Religious 
Discrimination Bill. Claims for greater protection for freedom of religious expression present 
particular challenges for employers who bear responsibilities to maintain psychologically 
safe and healthy workplaces for all their employees. . The present ‘general protections’ 
against discriminatory treatment in the Fair Work Act do not adequately deal with 
complaints of discrimination, largely because of the ease with which employers can excuse 
adverse action on the basis of their own workplace policies, but the proposals in the 
Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth) go too far in seeking to address that weakness. We 
propose that a more appropriate model for balancing the respective interests of all 
employees in a discrimination and harassment free work environment would be expanding 
the workplace bullying and unfair dismissal jurisdictions of the Fair Work Commission, to 
enable these kinds of conflicts to be managed in a proportionate and balanced manner. 
I  INTRODUCTION 
The debate in Australia about protecting religious freedom reached a crescendo in 2019 with 
the highly publicised dispute between star rugby player, Israel Folau, and his employers, Rugby 
Australia and Rugby NSW.1 Folau’s employment was terminated when Rugby Australia 
formed the view (supported by a Code of Conduct Tribunal) that Folau had committed serious 
breaches of the mandatory code of conduct in his player contract when he publicised religiously 
motivated homophobic views on social media. Folau’s own legal action was settled in 
December 2019, but the dispute had already generated two Exposure Drafts of a federal 
Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (with potentially a further version of the Bill to be released 
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1  For a news media summary of the matter, including a screenshot of Folau’s controversial social media post, Sam 
Clench, ‘One unresolved legal question at the heart of Israel Folau’s case’, news.com.au (25 June 2019) < 
https://www.news.com.au/sport/sports-life/one-unresolved-legal-question-at-the-heart-of-israel-folaus-
case/news-story/387b057b25ab325d35ea494b9ed087b3>. Folau had filed proceedings in the Federal Circuit 
Court of Australia alleging unlawful dismissal under the Fair Work Act 2009 (NSW) s 772, breach of contract, 
and restraint of trade: see Isileli (‘Israel’) Folau v Rugby Australia & Anor, Federal Circuit Court – Federal 
Law, Melbourne Registry MLG2486/2019, filed 31 July 2019. The matter was listed for hearing on 4 February 
2020 but settled on 5 December 2019. See ABC News, ‘Rugby Australia and Israel Folau settle legal dispute 




) and ongoing debate about the need for greater protection for religious freedom.2 This article 
seeks to contribute to that debate by recommending an approach to dealing with such disputes 
when they manifest in a threat to a worker’s job security.3   
While we acknowledge the need for more effective protection for workers’ entitlements 
to hold and express their own religious (and for that matter political) values, free from 
workplace discipline for that reason, we also recognise that employers are often placed in an 
invidious position as a consequence of an employee’s expression of robust religious and 
political views that threaten the wellbeing of other workers. In addition to their common law 
duty of care,4 employers owe statutory duties to provide safe and psychologically healthy 
workplaces for all employees,5 and their ability to manage that responsibility risks being 
compromised by too stringent a requirement to refrain from any discipline whatsoever of the 
expression of offensive views in the workplace. Employees also share the responsibility to co-
operate with employer policies designed to promote safe and healthy workplaces.6 Employers 
can be held vicariously liable for any harm inflicted by a co-worker in connection with 
employment if that harm flows from breach of the harassment provisions or general non-
discrimination obligations in anti-discrimination legislation,7 so employers do have a 
responsibility to take reasonable steps to manage their workplace culture through the 
                                                             
2  See more recent calls for State level religious discrimination laws in New South Wales by One Nation 
politician, Mark Latham: Ben Fordham, ‘Mark Latham proposes discrimination bill supporting religious 
freedoms’, 2GB 873AM (Radio transcript, 8 September 2020), <https://www.2gb.com/mark-latham-proposes-
discrimination-bill-supporting-religious-freedoms/>. 
3  The many serious threats to people’s religious freedoms outlined in the Australian Human Rights Commission 
and Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, Freedom of Religion in Australia: A focus on 
serious harms (July 2020) are not addressed in this paper.  We consider only the question of protecting those 
freedoms in the context of workplace disputes. 
4  See Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University (2005) 79 ALJR 839, 842-3; [2005] HCA 14, [12]; Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 98. 
5  See the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) (‘WHS Act’) s 19 which sets out the primary duty of care of a 
person conducting a business or undertaking to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, the health and safety of 
all workers engaged by them or whose work they influence .’ Health’ is defined in s 4 to mean both physical and 
psychological health. WHS Act s 28(d) provides that workers must co-operate with any ‘reasonable policy or 
procedure’ relating to health and safety at the workplace. Similar provisions can be found in the legislation for 
all the States and Territories which have adopted the model Work Health and Safety legislation. See Work 
Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld); Work Health and Safety Act 2012 (SA); Work Health and Safety Act 2012 
(Tas); Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (ACT); Work Health and Safety (National Uniform Legislation) Act 
2011 (NT). Although not adopting the model provisions, Victorian legislation also imposes broad duties on 
employers and employees to cooperate in ensuring safe and healthy workplaces, and define ‘health’ to include 
psychological health. See Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) s 20 and s 5. 
6  See WHS Act (n 5) s 28. See also the employee’s common law duty to co-operate in maintaining a safe 
workplace: X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177, 188, where it was held that it was an ‘inherent 
requirement’ of a job that the employee cooperate in the provision of a safe working environment. 
7  See for example the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 106. 
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promulgation of appropriate workplace conduct policies. While there is general support for the 
reform of federal anti-discrimination laws to address the absence of protections for religious 
discrimination in the federal sphere, there are concerns that the way in which the proposals 
have been framed could encroach on other human rights protections and override existing anti-
discrimination laws.8 Hence we do not regard the type of legislative approach advocated in the 
Exposure Drafts of the Bill9 as an effective way of addressing the challenges faced by 
employers.   In our view, a more effective solution for workplace disputes over this issue would 
be to expand the jurisdiction of the Fair Work Commission to deal with these issues as a matter 
of conciliation and arbitration for a ‘fair go all round’,10 much in the way that the Fair Work 
Commission presently manages its unfair dismissal jurisdiction,11 and its more recently 
introduced workplace bullying jurisdiction.12 This approach to resolving disputes may provide 
more effective protection for workers expressing religious and political commitments than are 
presently available under the General Protections provisions in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth),13 
because the way those provisions have been interpreted by the High Court of Australia has 
tended to favour employers’ rights to manage their own workplaces.14 We unpack this 
argument in several sections following. 
In section II we begin by relating the tale of the Israel Folau matter, as an illustration 
of two things.  First, the Folau story demonstrates the way in which values may clash: sincerely 
expressed religious views are capable of causing affront to the sensibilities of others in the 
workplaces, and can (in some cases) also threaten the viability of an employer’s business. We 
note several similar cases where the robust expression of religious or political views has 
generated litigation over a person’s entitlement to job security. Secondly, the Folau litigation 
demonstrates how these kinds of contests are presently managed under Australian workplace 
laws, as a claim that an employer has taken adverse action against an employee for a prohibited 
                                                             
8  See for example, Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission on the Draft Religious Discrimination Bill, 
2019, (27 September 2019) <https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/submission-draft-religious-discrimination-
bill>.  
9  For related developments in the state of NSW, see the Private Members’ Bill tabled by Mark Latham, Anti-
Discrimination Amendment (Religious Freedoms and Equality) Bill 2020 (NSW). 
10  This expression, which encapsulates the fundamental object of unfair dismissal laws, was first used in Re Loty 
and Holloway and the Australian Workers’ Union [1971] AR(NSW) 95. 
11  See Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Pt 3-2. 
12  See Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Pt 6-4B. 
13  See Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Pt 3-1. See also Allison Ballard and Patricia Easteal, ‘Mapping the Legal Remedy 
for Workplace Bullying: A Preliminary Overview’ (2014) 39(2) Alternative Law Journal 94; Jack de Flamingh, 
‘FWC’s Anti-Bullying Jurisdiction: Is it Working?’ (2015) 16 Law Society Journal 80.   
14  The key decisions, Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 
248 CLR 500 and Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243, 
are noted below. 
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reason, without lawful excuse. We explain why this avenue for litigating these kinds of claims 
has proven to be largely unproductive for employees. 
In section III we consider the aspects of the proposed Religious Discrimination Bill 
2019 (Cth) that would affect employers’ obligations and employees’ rights, in order to show 
that this solution to the problem would not necessarily produce favourable outcomes for all 
employees in any case, and may permit further discriminatory conduct against other vulnerable 
groups in workplaces. In section IV, we turn our attention to the way that the Fair Work 
Commission manages unfair dismissal and workplace bullying complaints, and suggest that 
these processes which are directed to finding a ‘fair go all round’ have the potential to recognise 
and balance the respective interests of all parties to these disputes: the employer, the outspoken 
employee, and others at the workplace affected by the conflict. We justify this view by (limited) 
reference to some of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and decisions 
of the Employment Tribunal in the United Kingdom on these kinds of matters, not for the 
purpose of commenting on that jurisprudence per se, but for the contribution it makes to an 
understanding of the concept of proportionality in managing disputes between various rights-
holders.15 
In section V we note some important qualifications to the current unfair dismissal 
provisions that would be necessary to widen access to this jurisdiction to all employees and 
other workers affected by these kinds of disputes. And finally, we offer some concluding 
observations in section VI. 
II RUGBY AUSTRALIA’S OFF-FIELD CONTEST   
Rugby Australia found itself at the centre of the debate about religious freedom in Australia 
when it purported to discipline one of its star players, Israel Folau, for posting a meme on a 
social media site that indicated that homosexuals would burn in hell, along with a list of other 
                                                             
15  Readers interested in the ECHR jurisprudence on these issues will find valuable insights in Hugh Collins, ‘The 
Protection of Civil Liberties in the Workplace’ (2006) 69(4) Modern Law Review 619; Virginia 
Mantouvalou,’Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’ (2008) 71(6) Modern Law 
Review 912; Astrid Sanders, ‘The Law of Unfair Dismissal and Behaviour Outside Work’ (2014) 34(2) Legal 
Studies 328;  Paul Wragg, ‘Free Speech Rights at Work: Resolving the Differences Between Practice and 
Liberal Principle’ (2015) 44(1) Industrial Law Journal 1. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting 
us to a case in the United States of America, Buonanno v AT&T Broadband LLC, 313 F Supp 2d 1069 (2004) 
which also addresses these issues, however we will not deal in this article with United States jurisprudence, 
given its complexity. 
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‘sinners’.16 Rugby Australia’s action followed a media storm, in which some commentators 
castigated Folau for expressing non-inclusive views, and some claimed that sponsors would 
withdraw support from Rugby Australia unless it disciplined him.17 Faced with such public 
outrage from fans and sponsors, Rugby Australia initiated disciplinary proceedings against 
Folau. From Rugby Australia’s point of view, the matter raised serious concerns about its 
ability to manage its business reputation, its relationships  with fans and sponsors, and its 
commitment to social inclusion, including support for  those people involved in the sport who 
were seriously upset by the publication of homophobic views by such a high profile 
ambassador for the sport.18 This kind of adverse publicity can be very damaging to an 
organisation. There is a social media organisation, known as ‘Sleeping Giants’, that makes it 
its business to publicise the names of sponsors of organisations that appear to tolerate racist, 
homophobic and misogynist views. This group campaigned against former 2GB radio 
broadcaster, Alan Jones, following his vitriolic attack on New Zealand’s Prime Minister, 
Jacinda Ardern.19 From the point of view of protecting business reputation and financial 
viability, it is not unreasonable for employers to take notice of these kinds of challenges. 
From a legal point of view, Rugby Australia relied on what it claimed to be express 
contractual rights. Rugby Australia relied on a term in Folau’s player contract that required him 
to abide by a Code of Conduct containing (among an extensive catalogue of provisions) 
prohibitions on using social media to disseminate homophobic views in contradiction of the 
inclusive values of Rugby Australia. The individual player contract was a standard form 
contract, negotiated collectively between Rugby Australia, its member clubs in each State, and 
the Rugby Union Players Association (RUPA) representing the employed players. It was also 
a term of this player contract that Rugby Australia should refer any allegation of breaches of 
                                                             
16  See Clench (n 1) for a picture of the meme. 
17  See Max Mason, ‘Rugby Australia does the right thing by sponsors’ Australian Financial Review, (Sydney, 8 
May 2019) <https://www.afr.com/companies/media-and-marketing/israel-folau-rugby-australia-does-the-right-
thing-by-sponsors-20190508-p51lbk >. Daisy Doctor, ‘Qantas reconsiders Wallabies sponsorship after player’s 
homophobic comments’, Boomtown (Blog, 9 April 2019),  
<https://www.bandt.com.au/qantas-reconsiders-israel-falou-sponsorship-homophobic-comments/> . There was 
also considerable media support for Folau’s right to express his religiously based views, and the debate 
continued until after Folau withdrew his claim for an undisclosed settlement. 
18  See for example the interview by Monique Shafter with Andy Brennan, ‘ Israel Folau comments “awful” says 
Andy Brennan, Australia's only openly gay male professional footballer’ ABC News, (Transcript, 3 September 
2019), <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-03/andy-brennan-openly-gay-israel-folau-awful-
comments/11474590>.  
19  See Lindsay Bennett, ‘Activist group Sleeping Giants targets Alan Jones advertisers’, AdNews (Newsletter, 9 
October 2018) https://www.adnews.com.au/news/activist-group-sleeping-giants-targets-alan-jones-advertisers. 
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the Code of Conduct to a Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), comprised of three members, one 
representing Rugby Australia, one RUPA, and one independent member. The CCT determined 
that Mr Folau had committed a ‘high level’ breach of the code, and recommended termination 
of his employment as the appropriate sanction. Rugby Australia promptly implemented this 
advice and terminated Folau’s contract, whereupon Folau commenced litigation alleging, 
among other things, breach of Fair Work Act s 772 prohibiting unlawful termination of 
employment on discriminatory grounds.20  
A Why ‘unlawful’ dismissal? 
The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) purports to protect employees from discriminatory treatment at 
work by providing a series of ‘general protections’ against adverse action because they have 
exercised a workplace right or manifest a protected characteristic.21  Section 351 of the Act 
lists a range of protected characteristics, most of which are also protected by a range of state 
and federal anti-discrimination laws.22  For our purposes, the list in s 351 includes religion and 
political opinion, and also sexual orientation. Importantly for the Israel Folau story, however, 
religion is not presently included among the protected characteristics in the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).23  
Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act is underpinned (largely) by the corporations power in 
Australia’s Constitution, so its provisions apply only to national system employers and their 
employees.24 In order to retain the comprehensive protections against unlawful dismissal for 
                                                             
20  See Isileli (‘Israel’) Folau v Rugby Australia & Anor, Federal Circuit Court – Federal Law, Melbourne Registry 
MLG2486/2019, filed 31 July 2019. 
21  Key provisions in Part 3-1 include s 340 which states the prohibition on taking adverse action against a person 
because of their workplace right, s 342 which defines ‘adverse action’, and s 361 which provides for a reversed 
burden of proof. 
22  See the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 
1992 (Cth), and Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) at federal level, and the following State enactments: Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW); Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld); Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (SA); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas); 
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT); Anti-Discrimination Act (NT). 
23  Coverage in NSW is limited to ethno-religious origin: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s4. On proposed 
reforms, see Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Religious Freedoms and Equality) Bill 2020 (NSW) and the 
inquiry of the Parliament of NSW Joint Select Committee on the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Religious 
Freedoms and Equality) Bill 2020 
<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/listofcommittees/Pages/committee-details.aspx?pk=267.> 
24  National system employers include all foreign, trading, and financial corporations and any employer included in 
the national system as a consequence of States referring industrial matters to Commonwealth, but there are still 
some gaps in coverage. For an understanding of the constitutional complexity of the coverage of the Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth) see Rosemary Owens, ‘Unfinished Constitutional Business: Building a National System to 
Regulate Work’ (2009) 22(3) Australian Journal of Labour Law 258. 
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discriminatory reasons that were contained in earlier iterations of the federal industrial 
legislation,25 the Fair Work Act includes provisions in Pt 6-4 of the Act to extend protection 
from ‘unlawful dismissal’ to non-national system employees. This Part of the Act is 
underpinned by the external affairs power in the Australian Constitution s 51(xxix), because it 
purports to give effect to Australia’s obligations under a number of International Labour 
Organisation conventions.26 Israel Folau is likely to have framed his claim as a breach of s 772 
of the Act, even though he was clearly employed by a national system employer, because his 
advisers were concerned about the risk that Rugby Australia would seek to raise a defence 
under the Fair Work Act s 351(2)(a) which exempts any conduct that is not unlawful in the 
place in which the conduct occurred.  Since the conduct occurred in NSW, and religion was 
not a protected characteristic under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), it is possible that 
Rugby Australia would have sought to defend its action on the basis that its conduct was not 
unlawful in the place in which it occurred. This defence is not available for an alleged breach 
of s 772. 
This particularly peculiar defence in the Fair Work Act s 351(2)(a) was not part of 
earlier federal workplace legislation.27  It has caused some difficulty for employees in a number 
of cases. For example, it was assumed in McIntyre v Special Broadcasting Service28 that a 
journalist who was dismissed for expressing objectionable political opinions about the sacred 
Australian holiday of Anzac Day could not bring a General Protections claim under s 351 
against his employer because political opinion was not a protected characteristic in NSW. 29  
This view was also taken in Rumble v The Partnership trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers30, 
concerning a legal consultant dismissed for expressing political opinions contrary to the 
                                                             
25  See Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 659(1). 
26  International Labour Organisation Convention No 111 Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 
25 June 1958; International Labour Organisation Convention No 156 Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment 
for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, 23 June 1981; International Labour 
Organisation Convention No 158, Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, 22 June 1982; 
International Labour Organisation Recommendation No R166, Termination of Employment Recommendation 
1982, 22 June 1982. See Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 771. 
27  See Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 659(2). The only defences in s 659(3) and (4) were for ‘inherent 
requirements of the particular position’, and the special exemption permitting religious organisations to 
discriminate in order to protect the sensibilities of adherents to their faith. 
28  [2015] FWC 6768, [30]-[38] (Cambridge C). 
29  McIntyre v Special Broadcasting Service  [2015] FWC 6768 was also settled prior to final determination. See  
Louise Hall, ‘Sacked reporter Scott McIntyre and SBS resolve dispute over Anzac Day tweets’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, (News report, 11 April 2016) < https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/sacked-reporter-scott-
mcintyre-and-sbs-resolve-dispute-over--anzac-day-tweets-20160411-go37vt.html >.  
30  (2019) 289 IR 72; [2019] FCA 1409; upheld on appeal to a full bench of the Federal Court of Australia:  Rumble 
v The Partnership trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (2020) 275 FCR 423; [2020] FCAFC 37. 
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interests of the firm’s clients. In that case, Perram J held that if the adverse action complained 
of had taken place in New South Wales, the defence in s 351(2)(a) would have applied, because 
Dr Rumble’s political opinion was not a protected characteristic under the Anti-discrimination 
Act 1977 (NSW).31 ‘If an action is not proscribed by any anti-discrimination law then plainly 
the action is not unlawful.’32 
 On the other hand, Manousaridis J, in Cameron v Goldwind Australia Pty Ltd,33 has 
taken the view that s 351(2)(a) only excludes conduct where the state law contains an express 
exemption for certain otherwise discriminatory conduct.  This was, however, an interlocutory 
injunction case before the Federal Circuit Court and no injunction was ordered in any event, so  
the safest option for employees in New South Wales and South Australia where the anti-
discrimination legislation does not protect religion or political opinion is to proceed with a 
claim under s 772.34 
B A more serious gap in the General Protections 
The risk that Rugby Australia might rely successfully on a defence under s 351(2)(a) was not, 
in our view, the most significant risk to Israel Folau’s prospects of success, had he continued 
with his claim instead of accepting a settlement. More serious was the risk that Rugby Australia 
could establish that it did not take adverse action against him ‘because’ of his religious views. 
Clearly, Folau was dismissed as a consequence of expressing his religiously motivated views 
about homosexual people being destined for hell. Had he refrained from expressing those 
views, he would not have lost his place on the team. This, however, is not the test for 
establishing a General Protections claim. Rather, the court interrogates the reasons that the 
decision-maker has given about their motivation for taking adverse action, and if they can 
provide a credible reason that does not include a prohibited reason, they will have satisfied 
their reverse burden of proof in Fair Work Act s 361. Where employers have been able to 
                                                             
31  (2019) 289 IR 72, 99-100; [2019] FCA 1409, [141]-[143]. 
32  2019) 289 IR 72, 100; [2019] FCA 1409, [142]. Perram J cited the supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth), [220] as justification for this interpretation. 
33  [2019] FCCA 1541. 
34  This is the advice offered by the Fair Work Commission’s Benchbook on General Protections: 
<https://www.fwc.gov.au/general-protections-benchbook/other-protections/exemptions>. See also Belinda 
Smith, ‘Anti-Discrimination Law’, in Carolyn Sappideen, Paul O’Grady and Joellen Riley, Macken’s Law of 
Employment, 8th edn, (Thomson, 2016), [15-280]. 
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establish that their reason for disciplining an employee was the employee’s breach of a code of 
conduct, employers have escaped liability for breach of the General Protections.35 
The cases involving the exercise of rights to engage in industrial activity provide the 
most cogent illustrations of the operation of the General Protections, and their weakness in the 
face of a contest with an employer’s contractual code of conduct. The High Court of Australia 
has already determined, in a case concerning the protection in Fair Work Act s 346 of the right 
to engage in industrial activities, that an employer did not take impermissible adverse action 
when it dismissed a unionist for holding up a sign condemning ‘scabs’ on the grounds that this 
constituted a flagrant breach of the employer’s workplace civility policy.36 Ever since the High 
Court decision in Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further 
Education (‘Barclay’),37 which also concerned an employee dismissed as a consequence of, 
but not ‘because of’, his conduct as a union official, the focus in adverse action cases has been 
on the subjective reasons given by the decision-maker for their conduct.38   
Rumble v The Partnership trading as HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (‘Rumble’) illustrates 
the focus on the employer’s subjective reasons in determining whether adverse action has been 
taken for a prohibited reason in a case involving the expression of a political opinion.39 Dr Gary 
Rumble was employed as a consultant to a firm of solicitors, and in that capacity he had 
undertaken a review of sexual misconduct in the defence forces.  Over a course of years he 
became concerned that the government had not taken adequate steps to address the findings of 
his report.40 He began to make comments in the media (including on a television program) 
criticising the Department of Defence, who continued to be a client of the firm.41  He claimed 
that he was making these comments in his private capacity, and not as a member of the firm.  
                                                             
35  See for example Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 243 
(‘BHP Coal’).  
36  See BHP Coal (2014) 253 CLR 243, 247, [3].  
37  (2012) 248 CLR 500. 
38  For more detailed analyses of these provisions, see Anna Chapman, Kathleen Love and Beth Gaze, ‘The 
Reverse Onus of Proof Then and Now: The Barclay Case and the History of the Fair Work Act’s Union 
Victimization and Freedom of Association Provisions’ (2014) 37 UNSW Law Journal 471; Beth Gaze and Anna 
Chapman, ‘Evaluating the Adverse Action Provisions of the Fair Work Act’ in John Howe, Anna Chapman and 
Ingrid Landau (eds) The Evolving Project of Labour Law: Foundations, Development and Future Research 
Directions (Federation Press, 2017) ; Liam Meagher, ‘Australian Courts’ Approaches to Unconscious Direct 
Discrimination and Adverse Action’ (2017) 30(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 1; Joellen Riley, ‘General 
Protections: Industrial Activities and Collective Bargaining’ in Shae McCrystal, Breen Creighton and Anthony 
Forsyth (eds), Collective Bargaining under the Fair Work Act (Federation Press, 2017); Anna Chapman, ‘Part 3-
1, Adverse Action and Equality’ (2020) 33 Australian Journal of Labour Law 107. 
39  (2019) 289 IR 72; [2019] FCA 1409. 
40  (2019) 289 IR 72, 85-86; [2019] FCA 1409, [67]-[70]. 
41  (2019) 289 IR 72, 88; [2019] FCA 1409, [80]. 
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Nevertheless, the managing partner of the firm issued a direction that he should not make media 
comments at all without first seeking permission, and in any event, should not make public 
comments critical of the firm’s clients. The firm promulgated a new media comment policy in 
response to Dr Rumble’s conduct, but Dr Rumble continued to ignore the policy, claiming a 
personal right to make comments in his private capacity.42 Ultimately, his contract with the 
firm was terminated, for ‘repeatedly disobeying a direction to cease from criticising the firm’s 
clients’.43  Justice Perram recognised that Dr Rumble’s contravention of the media policy ‘was 
constituted by his expression of political opinion’, so as a matter of fact, his political expression 
caused his dismissal.44 Nevertheless, that was not the relevant enquiry.  The question to be 
answered was, what was the subjective mental state of the decision maker who took the adverse 
action?  Which characterisation of the conduct actuated the decision maker? In this case, it was 
the characterisation of the conduct as a breach of the firm’s media comment policy. It is 
difficult to imagine that the case between Folau and Rugby Australia would have been 
determined differently from this case, so long as Rugby Australia could present a convincing 
argument that its decision-maker was motivated only by a concern to enforce its contractual 
code of conduct which, on its face, made no mention of religion. 
The consistent line of authority following Barclay and BHP Coal means that employers 
will frequently avoid a finding that they have breached the General Protections, because they 
will be able to point to a legitimate subjective reason for taking adverse action, even when the 
reason is simply an alternative characterisation of the employee’s exercise of a workplace right 
or freedom.45 On the whole, the General Protections provisions have proven to be a 
considerable disappointment for employee advocates hoping to see some genuine protection 
for employees’ workplace rights, including claimed rights to express unpopular religious and 
political views.46   
 
III NEW FEDERAL PROVISIONS TO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH 
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
 
                                                             
42  (2019) 289 IR 72, 90-91;  [2019] FCA 1409, [96]-[97]. 
43  (2019) 289 IR 72, 76;  [2019] FCA 1409, [14]. 
44  (2019) 289 IR 72, 97-98;  [2019] FCA 1409, [132]. 
45  See also Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150. 
46  See the commentary noted at n 3838. 
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A Existing discrimination laws 
In the middle of the Folau drama, the Morrison Coalition government tabled a Religious 
Discrimination Bill, intending to add statutory protection against religious discrimination to 
the suite of federal anti-discrimination statutes purporting to protect citizens from 
discrimination on various grounds in all aspects of life, and not only at work. As an alternative 
to bringing a General Protections claim under the Fair Work Act, employees complaining of 
discriminatory treatment because of their race, sex, age or disability also have an option to 
pursue a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission. A patchwork of state anti-
discrimination laws also gives rise to other avenues of redress.47 The federal parliament has 
introduced new attributes to the scope of legislative protection from discrimination in a 
piecemeal manner over time, commencing with race in 1975,48 sex in 198449, disability in 
199250, age in 200451 and finally sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status in 
amendments to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) in 2013.52  
The latter constellation of protected attributes (sexual orientation, gender identity and 
intersex status) 53 are particularly relevant to the religious discrimination Bill, because some 
forms of robust expression of certain religiously motivated opinions in a workplace context 
may constitute discrimination or sexual harassment under the Sex Discrimination Act, and 
trigger the vicarious liability provisions, sheeting responsibility for that conduct back to the 
employer. The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 106 provides that an employer is liable for 
acts done by an employee ‘in connection with’ their employment.  This statutory expression 
has been held to capture a broader range of conduct than vicarious liability under the common 
law for conduct ‘in the course of’ employment.54 An employer could be found to be vicariously 
liable for discrimination or harassment engaged in by employees expressing religiously based 
antagonism towards others because of their sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex 
status. An employer can defend a vicarious liability claim by showing they took ‘all reasonable 
                                                             
47  Space here precludes a full discussion of all State enactments.  For a useful table showing all State legislation 
and the attributes protected in each jurisdiction, see Beth Gaze and Belinda Smith, Equality and Discrimination 
Law in Australia: An Introduction, (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 295-307. 
48  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
49  Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). 
50  Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). 
51  Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). 
52  Inserted into the Sex Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) by Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, 
Gender identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013 (Cth). 
53  See Sex Discrimination Act ss 5A-5C. 
54  See South Pacific Resort Hotels v Trainor (2005) 144 FCR 402, which concerned alleged sexual harassment 
occurring after work hours in accommodation provided by the employer. 
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steps’ to prevent the conduct in question. Promulgating and enforcing workplace codes of 
conduct is one way employers may show that they have taken such steps. However, if 
protections for religious discrimination were enacted based on the approach in these Bills, the 
ability to enforce codes of conduct of this nature would be diminished (discussed below).   
B Religious Discrimination Bill 
The Religious Discrimination Bill proposed at the end of 2019 would have provided employees 
who have been disciplined for holding or expressing religious commitments with an alternative 
avenue for complaint in the federal system. There have to date been two iterations of the Bill 
released for public comment.  Our observations, which are necessarily tentative given that 
consultation processes have been undertaken  on two Draft Exposure Bills and no final version 
has yet been tabled in Parliament, focus on the later version released on 10 December 2019.  
The enactment of a legislative proscription of religious discrimination is generally a 
welcome development in the evolution of federal anti-discrimination laws and has a sound 
basis for implementation under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).  Overall while the prospect of a federal statute outlawing religious-based 
discrimination is not particularly controversial in itself, the drafting of this particular Bill 
provoked considerable controversy and many submissions from interested parties.55  At the 
heart of the controversy is whether the proposed law strikes an appropriate balance with other 
protected rights (such as sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status) and whether it 
would excuse discrimination by faith-based organisations and individuals against others, who 
would otherwise be protected under other federal, state and territory discrimination laws.   
Space does not permit interrogation of the full range of complex questions raised by the Bill.  
We mention only those aspects of the most recent draft that speak to the contest between an 
employer’s claim of a right to govern their own workplaces in the interests of psychological 
health and safety, and employees’ assertion of rights to express their religious convictions 
without sanction. 
1 Statements of belief 
One of the most controversial aspects of the Bill is that the expression of a personal belief that 
qualifies as a ‘statement of belief’ of a religious nature would attract special protections.   
                                                             
55  For submissions on the first and second draft Bills, see <https://www.ag.gov.au/rights-and-




Section 42 of the Bill provides that ‘in and of itself’ a statement does not constitute 
discrimination for the purposes of any anti-discrimination laws, a particular provision of 
Tasmanian anti-discrimination laws,56 or any other law prescribed by regulation.  However, 
this protection would not arise if the statement of belief was malicious, likely to harass, 
threaten, seriously intimidate or vilify another person of group of person,57 or that a reasonable 
person would conclude that, in expressing the belief, the person was counselling, promoting, 
encouraging or urging conduct that would constitute a serious offence.58   
A ‘belief’ would qualify for protection if it was a religious belief, made in good faith, ‘that 
a person of the same religion as the first person could reasonably consider to be in accordance 
with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teaching of that religion’.59  This implies that religious 
beliefs must be shared by more than one person. Idiosyncratic and heretical beliefs appear not 
to be given protection. Nevertheless, given that there is no attempt to define religion and that 
the High Court60 has taken a broad approach to what belief systems can claim religious status, 
it is only a question of whether a person of the same religion would agree that the statement 
accords with the beliefs or teaching of that particular religion.  It does not require that the belief 
meet any objective, general standard of reasonableness.61  Nor does it take the approach that 
the UK Employment Tribunal has adopted in interpreting a ‘belief’ worthy of protection as a 
philosophical or religious belief under the Equality Act 2010 UK). Before a belief can be 
afforded protection under that Act it must be ‘worthy of respect in a democratic society, [and] 
not be incompatible with human dignity and fundamental rights of others’.62    
Proposed s 42 of the Religious Discrimination Bill provides a broad exoneration of all 
statements of belief from liability. It also changes the established balance of co-existing state, 
territory and federal anti-discrimination legislation.  If enacted, a provision of this kind would 
present particular difficulties for statements of belief made at a workplace that might impact 
adversely on the health, welfare or safety of others in the workplace or visitors to a workplace. 
Unless the statement fell within one of the exceptions, it would not be conduct to which an 
                                                             
56  Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), s 17(1). This provision prohibits conduct which ‘offends, humiliates, 
intimidates, insults or ridicules another person’ on the basis of attributes including (inter alia) sexual orientation, 
gender identity, and intersex variations of sex characteristics. 
57  This exception is narrower in scope than what is vilification under other federal laws.   
58  Religious Discrimination Bill, cll 42(2), 28(1)(b). 
59  Ibid, cl 5. 
60  See Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Victoria) (1983) 49 ALR 65. 
61  See Wojciech Sadurski, ‘On Legal Definitions of “Religion” (1989) 63 Australian Law Journal 834, 836-8 for a 
critique of the High Court’s view of religion. 
62  Grainger plc v Nicholson [2010] ICR 360, [24]. 
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employer could direct a proportionate disciplinary response. For example, a statement of belief 
targeted at a fellow employee’s sexual orientation might adversely impact that individual, but 
may not necessarily meet the threshold of harassment.   In the absence of this exoneration, such 
conduct could still constitute a breach of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) if it amounted 
to affording less favourable treatment in the conditions of work to the targeted employee than 
to others, and an employer could be held to be vicariously liable for harm suffered as a 
consequence of that breach, if the employer took no reasonable steps to prevent it.  Although 
the provisions of the Bill attempt to ensure that statements of this nature would not be 
actionable under anti-discrimination law, such conduct may still have an adverse impact on the 
psychological health or wellbeing of the targeted employee and hence put the employer at risk 
of being in breach of their work, health and safety obligations. As noted in our introduction, 
work health and safety legislation in most states and territories provides that all persons 
conducting a business undertaking have a primary duty of care to ‘ensure so far as is reasonably 
practicable’ the health and safety of persons at work, and ‘health’ includes psychological 
health.63  
2 Conduct rules, indirect discrimination, and inherent requirements. 
The Folau matter sparked considerable debate about the manner in which workplace codes of 
conduct affect an employee’s freedom to express their beliefs on a subject unconnected with 
their work but likely to have repercussions for the employer’s business or for relations within 
the workplace.64 The Bill includes provisions that attempt to provide a legislative resolution of 
that debate. Proposed s 8 is directed to the manner in which an indirect discrimination claim 
should be assessed where a person expressing a religious belief is adversely affected by a 
condition which is a workplace conduct rule.  In other areas of discrimination law, a condition 
that has or is likely to disadvantage a particular group may be justified if it can be shown that 
the condition is reasonable.  The standard practice is to assess the reasonableness of the 
condition by balancing the criteria established by the jurisprudence in the field,65 and in 
                                                             
63  See the enactments listed (n 5). 
64  See for example Samantha Smith, ‘Code of conduct vs the Fair Work Act – is firing Folau illegal?’, HRM, 
(Newsletter, 13 May 2019)  < https://www.hrmonline.com.au/employment-law/folau-code-condcut-vs-fair-
work-act/>;; Stephen Booth, ‘Out of Work Employee Conduct vs Internal Codes of Conduct: the Cases of Israel 
Folau and Jack de Belin’ Coleman Grieg Lawyers, (Newsletter, undated) 
<https://www.colemangreig.com.au/News-1293-Out-of-Work-Employee-Conduct-vs-Internal-Codes-of-
Conduct-The-Cases-of-Israel-Folau-and-Jack-de-Belin.aspx >; Josh Bornstein, ‘Did you cheer for Israel Folau’s 
sacking? Sorry, but you can’t have it both ways’ ABC News (Transcript, 7 August 2019) 
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-07/israel-folau-should-be-able-to-go-back-to-work/11386826 >. 
65  See Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1992) 173 CLR 349. 
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accordance with any factors that are articulated in the relevant anti-discrimination statute.66  
The Bill proposes a set of criteria for reasonableness that would apply only to indirect 
discrimination on the ground of religious belief or activity.  In the case of workplace conduct 
rules, the specific factor to be considered  is ‘the extent to which the rule would limit the ability 
of an employee to hold or engage in their religious belief or activity’.67 A conduct rule that 
would affect or restrict an employee from making a statement of belief, other than in the course 
of the employee’s employment, would be deemed not to be reasonable where the employer is 
a private entity with an annual turnover of more than $50 million, unless compliance with the 
rule by employees is ecessary to avoid unjustifiable financial hardship to the relevant 
employer.68    This carve-out for conduct in the course of employment, raises the often-disputed 
territory of the employees’ ‘common law right’ ‘to wear what [they choose], to act as [they 
choose], in matters not affecting [their] work’.69  Under the common law, whenever a matter 
can be shown to affect work, even in the most peripheral manner, it is lawful and reasonable 
for an employer to issue orders in respect of that matter.70 The Explanatory Memorandum for 
the Bill71 states: 
Subclause 8(3) only applies to employer conduct rules which restrict religious 
expression outside of work hours. Nothing in this subclause affects the ability of 
relevant employers to regulate religious expression at work. The reasonableness of 
employer conduct rules which restrict religious expression during work must be 
considered in accordance with the general reasonableness test at subclause 8(2), 
including paragraph 8(2)(d).72  
This still leaves unresolved the sticky problem of how conduct that occurs outside the spatial 
or temporal confines of the workplace might have repercussions for harmonious relationships 
and the management of the workplace.  These days, many employment disputes arise as a 
consequence of employees expressing contrary views on social media. Employees seek to 
                                                             
66  See for example Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 7B.  
67  Religious Discrimination Bill cl 8(2)(d).  
68  Ibid cl 8(3)(b).  
69  Australian Tramways Employees’ Association v Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (‘Tramways’) (1912) 6 CAR 35, 
42. Tramways was not merely a matter of a dress regulation. At heart it concerned employees’ rights to express 
their affiliation with their trade union, so it also concerned the right to express deeply held convictions.  
70  See McManus v Scott-Charlton (1996) 70 FCR 16, 28; [1996] FCA 904 [56] (Finn J): ‘once an employee’s 
conduct can be shown to have significant and adverse effects in the workplace – because of its impact on 
workplace relations, on the productivity of others, or on the effective conduct of the employer’s business – that 
conduct becomes a proper matter of legitimate concern to an employer, and does so because of its 
consequences’. 
71  Exposure Draft of the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 Explanatory Notes. 
72  Ibid, 129. 
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claim that their Facebook and Instagram accounts are private spaces, but when these posts leak 
into the public sphere of work (as they often do), they can result in justified workplace 
discipline, on the basis that the posts have caused grief for the employer or co-workers.73 In 
Linfox Australia Pty Ltd v Stutsel, a Fair Work Commissioner noted that ‘[u]nlike 
conversations in a pub or café, the Facebook conversations leave a permanent written record 
of statements and comments made by the participants which can be read at any time into the 
future until they are taken down by the page owner’.74  
Under the proposed Bill the ability of large private sector employers to argue the 
reasonableness of their conduct rules in the face of a claim that those rules indirectly 
discriminated on the grounds of religious belief or activity would be limited to relying on 
unjustifiable financial hardship alone.75  This excludes the possibility of arguing other relevant 
factors, including the impact on other employees or the employer’s corporate reputation. 
Finally, the Bill also reframed how conduct rules should interact with the defence of ‘inherent 
requirements’ of a job, which is also a feature of other anti-discrimination laws and the General 
Protections provisions in the Fair Work Act.76  The Bill provided that directing an employee to 
comply with a conduct rule that did not meet the requirements of reasonableness could not be 
an inherent requirement of employment.77  Again, the opportunity for  large private sector 
employers to balance a range of factors in determining the inherent requirements of the job 
under the approach advocated by the Bill would be restricted by the manner that reasonableness 
is to be determined.  The jurisprudence of the High Court on this topic involves a more 
contextual approach that extends beyond the physical ability to carry out the tasks, 
‘because employment is not a mere physical activity in which an employee participates 
as an automaton.  It takes place in a social, legal and economic context. Unstated, but 
legitimate, employment requirements may stem from this context.  It is therefore always 
permissible to have regard to this context when determining the inherent requirements 
of a particular employment.’78  
                                                             
73  See for example Linfox Australia Pty Ltd v Stutsel (2012) 217 IR 52; Wilkinson-Reed v Launtoy Pty Ltd [2014] 
FWC 644; Smith v Fitzgerald (2011) 208 IR 101. See generally Louise Thornthwaite, ‘Social Media, Unfair 
Dismissal and the Regulation of Employees’ Conduct Outside Work’ (2013) 26 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 164; Andrew Corney, ‘Unfair Dismissal Relating to the Use of Social Media – An Analysis of Case 
History’ (2014) 12(1) Canberra Law Review 144.   
74  [2012] FWAFB 7097, [26]. 
75  See King v Jetstar Airways Pty Limited [2012] FCAFC 115.   
76  See Fair Work Act s 351(2)(b). 
77  Religious Discrimination Bill 2019, cl 8(3). 
78  X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177, 187-188. 
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In our view, the Bill pursues a laudable goal in seeking to protect individuals from 
discrimination on the basis of their religious beliefs,79 however it overreaches that goal to the 
extent that it purports to defend those who engage in discriminatory treatment of others.  A 
broadly conceived notion of ‘reasonableness’, and the notion of the ‘inherent requirements of 
the job’ have been important features of Australian discrimination laws, ensuring a measure of 
balance and proportionality in their application. The Religious Discrimination Bill, as 
conceived in its 10 December 2019 iteration, presents a risk that new religious discrimination 
protections will  disrupt other antidiscrimination laws. Perhaps this is a consequence of the 
Exposure Bills being made available for public comment as a response to the furore 
surrounding the Folau matter, and that free of that influence, more proportionate laws will be 
developed to protect religious freedom in a manner that is coherent with other 
antidiscrimination laws.  
 In any event, we advocate that any development of further protection for the expression 
of religious beliefs without jeopardising job security be fashioned to fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Fair Work Commission as a matter for conciliation and arbitration. As we demonstrated 
in Part 1, the rights-based model of the General Protections which takes disputes through the 
Federal Court system for final resolution has proved singularly unsuccessful in vindicating 
employees’ workplace rights. Commentators note the significant limitations of an enforcement 
model that relies on individual complainants to pursue claims through the federal court system, 
if the matter has not been resolved by conciliation, presenting those who experience 
discrimination with onerous hurdles to secure any remedy.80 Similarly, some observers suggest 
that discrimination at work would be better regulated as a matter of workplace safety.81 In light 
                                                             
79  We do not seek in this article to address the extensive philosophical literature on religion and the law. Our 
pragmatic concern is to interrogate the appropriate means for resolving disputes about religious expression at 
work on the assumption that there is evidence of broad consensus in the community that religious freedom 
should be protected. 
80  See for example Belinda Smith, ‘A Regulatory Analysis of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth): Can it Effect 
Equality or Only Redress Harm?’ in C Arup et al (eds) Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on 
the Construction, Constitution and Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships (Federation Press, 
2016); Dominique Allen, ‘Remedying Discrimination: The Limits of the Law and the Need for a Systemic 
Approach’ (2010) 29 University of Tasmania Law Review 83; Anna Chapman, Beth Gaze, and Adriana Orifici, 
‘Substantive Equality at Work: Still Elusive Under Australia’s Fair Work Act’ (2017) 30 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 214; Belinda Smith, Melanie Schleiger and Liam Elphick, ‘Preventing Sexual Harassment at Work: 
Exploring the Promise of Work Health and Safety Laws’ (2019) 32 Australian Journal of Labour Law 219, 227-
230. 
81  See for example Therese MacDermott, ‘The Duty to Provide a Harassment-free Work Environment’ (1995) 37 
(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 495.  Belinda Smith, Melanie Schleiger and Liam Elphick, ‘Preventing 
Sexual Harassment at Work: Exploring the Promise of Work Health and Safety Laws’ (2019) 32 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 219; Elizabeth Shi and Freeman Zhong, ‘Addressing Sexual Harassment Law’s 
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of the problem discussed above and , the risk of a clash of conflicting workplace rights between 
different people in a workplace, including both the outspoken believer and the outraged ‘sinner’ 
condemned to hell by their rhetoric, we propose that these kinds of matters be considered 
appropriate for resolution as interests disputes, by an administrative body (such as the Fair 
Work Commission).  The Commission could be charged with finding a solution that provides 
a ‘fair go all round’, and empowered to order a range of appropriate remedies to address the 
ongoing management of such conflicts in the workplace, much in the same way that the Fair 
Work Commission has developed in its workplace bullying jurisdiction.82 
IV FINDING A FAIRLY BALANCED SOLUTION  
Often an employee who can establish the essential elements of a General Protections claim will 
nevertheless pursue an unfair dismissal application under the Fair Work Act Part 3-2 instead. 
The advantages of an unfair dismissal application for both parties are that it can be quickly 
resolved, at relatively small expense, and it may result in reinstatement of the worker if it is 
shown that the employer’s decision was ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’.83  Applications must 
be brought within 21 days of termination of the employment, filing fees are modest, and the 
process is initiated by filing a simple form that can be managed without legal representation.84 
If the parties are willing, it can be resolved very informally by a telephone conference.85 If the 
matter does eventually go to compulsory arbitration, the applicant may be afforded a remedy 
even if they have not been completely faultless themselves, although misconduct on the part of 
the employee will be taken into account in determining the quantum of a compensation award.86  
This is because the objective of unfair dismissal protections is to permit a Commissioner 
exercising administrative power to determine a ‘fair go all round’ for all parties concerned.87  
                                                             
Inadequacies in Altering Behaviour and Preventing Harm: A Structural Approach’ (2020) 43(1) UNSW Law 
Journal 155. 
82  On the remedial option available, see Fair Work Act s 789FF, Fair Work Commission, Anti-Bullying 
Benchbook, 114-129. 
83  Fair Work Act s 385(b). Reinstatement requires a return to actual duties, and not merely reinstatement of the 
contract: see Blackadder v Ramsey Butchering Services Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 539. 
84  See Fair Work Act s 394.   
85  For a more comprehensive account of the dispute resolution processes for unfair dismissal applications see 
Therese MacDermott and Joellen Riley, ‘ADR and Industrial Tribunals: Innovations and Challenges in 
Resolving Individual Workplace Grievances’ (2012) 38(2) Monash University Law Review 82-102. 
86  See Fair Work Act s 392(3). 
87  Fair Work Act s 381(2). 
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This is the Australian vernacular for a proportionate decision that takes into account all 
competing claims and finds a balance between them.88 
The disadvantages of the unfair dismissal option include strict eligibility requirements 
that exclude so-called ‘high income’ earners whose employment is not covered by a modern 
award or enterprise agreement, and employees who have not served a minimum employment 
period.89 Also, the primary remedy of reinstatement is rarely awarded in arbitrated matters, and 
compensation is capped at a maximum of six months’ remuneration.90 (Statistics are not 
available to confirm the optimistic possibility that more reinstatements may result from 
voluntary settlements at the conciliation stage.)  Also, the unfair dismissal jurisdiction only 
becomes available to an employee after they have been dismissed.   
One of the important features of the Fair  Work Commission’s workplace bullying 
jurisdiction under the Fair Work Act Part 6 – 4B is that it provides scope for employees to seek 
assistance in dealing with bullying behaviour while they remain employed.91 ‘Bullied at work’ 
is defined as repeated and unreasonable behaviour that creates a risk to health and safety.  The 
list of conduct that the Commission has held constitutes bullying includes the ways in which 
religiously-motivated shaming based on a person’s sexual orientation, gender identity or 
intersex status might be characterised: humiliation, sarcasm, victimisation, verbal abuse, 
emotional abuse, belittling, harassment, isolation, freezing-out, ostracism, innuendo, 
disrespect, and mocking.92  When it receives a complaint the Fair Work Commission must take 
action within 14 days, by gathering information, calling a conference or holding a hearing.  
While it can make a broad range of orders designed to stop the bullying conduct, it cannot order 
any compensation, although it can require an employer to continue to pay wages to a worker 
who is stood down while a matter is being resolved.93 Typical orders direct employers to 
                                                             
88  The notion of the ‘fair go all round’ was first articulated in Re Loty and Holloway v Australian Workers’ Union 
[1971] AR(NSW) 95, a case decided by the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission exercising its 
jurisdiction to settle an industrial dispute that involved termination of some employees’ contracts. This case is 
still cited in the note to the Fair Work Act s 381(2). 
89  See Fair Work Act ss 382-384. The high-income threshold (see Fair Work Act s 382(b)(iii) and Fair Work 
Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 2.13) is reviewed annually, and in July 2020 was raised to $153,600. 
90  The Fair Work Commission’s Annual Report: Access to Justice 2018-19, Appendix D, Tables D1 and D6 
showed that in the year ended June 2019, of the 8,161 unfair dismissal matters settled by conciliation, only 57 
resulted in reinstatement, and of the 229 matters that went to arbitration, only 13 resulted in reinstatement. 
These figures are consistent with previous years. 
91  See Rodney Worth and Joan Squelch, ‘Stop the Bullying: The Anti-bullying provisions in the Fair Work Act 
and Restoring the employment relationship’ (2015) 38 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1015. 
92  Amie Mac v Bank of Queensland Limited [2015] FWC 774, [99] (Hatcher VP)  13 February 2015). 
93  Fair Work Act s 789FF(1). South Eastern Sydney Local Health District v Lal [2019] FWCFB 1475, 
[27] (Hatcher VP, Sams DP, Hampton C, (7 March 2019). 
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institute practices that will avoid opportunities for bullying, such as separating antagonists into 
different rosters and locations, or require employers to moderate communication between the 
employees involved.94 Employers may also be required to implement anti-bullying policies and 
educate their staff in compliance.95  
The main advantage in recommending that the Fair Work Commission’s processes for 
dealing with unfair dismissal and workplace bullying complaints may provide a more suitable 
means of dealing with workplace religious discrimination complaints, is that these processes 
offer a quick and less formal method of dealing with a matter that can guide the parties in  
finding a compromise solution to their dispute. An unfair dismissal complaint may, for 
example, have provided a more suitable solution for Ms Banerji, the public servant disciplined 
for publishing anonymous commentary critical of her employer on social media. 96   Her case 
reached the High Court on the question of whether she enjoyed a constitutional right to freedom 
of political speech.97 In the course of rejecting her claim, the High Court noted that Ms 
Banerji’s entitlement to contest her dismissal under the unfair dismissal provisions in the Fair 
Work Act was an aspect of the procedural protections in the Australian Public Service Code of 
Conduct that ensured that it did not unreasonably restrain public servants’ expression of 
political views.98 There is no record of Ms Banerji challenging her dismissal as ‘harsh, unjust 
or unreasonable’ under the Fair Work Act Pt 3-2, although she did attempt to seek an injunction 
preventing her dismissal under Pt 3-1 (the General Protections).99 Edelman J appears to have 
treated Ms Banerji’s case with considerably more sympathy than others on the bench, although 
he reached essentially the same conclusion. He expressed the view that loss of employment 
can be an extreme and indeed ‘catastrophic’ punishment for breach of a code of conduct.100  
                                                             
94  See for example  South Eastern Sydney Local Health District v Lal [2019] FWCFB 1475, [24] (Hatcher VP, 
Sams DP, Hampton C). 
95  See Re Ms LP [2015] FWC 6602, [194]  (Hampton C);  CF and NW [2015] FWC 5272, [31]-[34] (Hampton C). 
96  Comcare v Banerji (2019) 93 ALJR 900; [2019] HCA 23. 
97  This implied constitutional guarantee was established and explained in a number of cases: Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 117 CLR 1 
and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.  For commentary see  H P Lee ’The 
Implied Freedom of Political Communication’ in H P Lee and George Winterton (eds) Australian Constitutional 
Landmarks (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 383; Nicholas Aroney, ‘the Implied Rights Revolution – 
Balancing Means and Ends?’ in  H P Lee and Peter Gerangelos, Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen 
Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton, (Federation Press,  2009),  173, 178-186. 
98  (2019) 93 ALJR 900, 915; [2019] HCA 23,  [41] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ); 923, [87] (Gageler J); 
929, [125] (Gordon J); 943, [198] (Edelman J). It is interesting to note that none of the bench referred to Ms 
Banerji’s aborted claim brought under Fair Work Act  s 351. 
99  Banerji v Bowles [2013] FCCA 1052. For an explanation of the long history of all proceedings in the Banerji 
litigation see Kieran Pender, ‘Comcare v Banerji: Public Servants and Political Communication’ (2019) 41(1) 
Sydney Law Review 131. 
100  (2019) 93 ALJR 900, 941, 942; [2019] HCA 23, [187], [195]. 
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This is the language of harshness: it describes a dismissal that may have been unwarranted 
because the punishment inflicted was disproportionate to the offence. 
A General Protections claim may also be conciliated by the Fair Work Commission, if 
the parties consent to conciliation, however a contested matter will be heard by a court 
exercising federal jurisdiction, because the General Protections constitute legal rights, 
determinable only by courts exercising judicial power.  There will be a clear winner and a loser 
in such a contest: there is no scope for finding a compromise in a ‘fair go all round’. As we 
have seen, in so many General Protections claims even those employees who have clearly been 
disadvantaged as a consequence of exercising a workplace right will be losers, so long as the 
employer can point to a credible, legitimate reason for taking adverse action, usually based in 
some workplace policy.  
The prospect of a compromise solution in an unfair dismissal determination (even when 
it goes through to compulsory arbitration) means that this process is particularly suitable to 
contests involving conflicting  interests – not only the interests of employer and employee, but 
the interests of others at the workplace aggrieved by an outspoken employee’s expression of 
censorious religious views. The discretion to find the ‘fair go all round’ affords the Fair Work 
Commission an opportunity to arrive at a balanced and proportionate outcome, and to make 
appropriate orders to give effect to that outcome.  The concept of proportionality is an important 
one in cases involving contests of this kind. 
Consider, for example, Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor (‘Gaynor’),101 a case in 
which the High Court was required to consider whether a decision to terminate the commission 
of an Army Reservist was a proportionate exercise of the Army’s discretion to discipline its 
members, notwithstanding their exercise of a claim to free expression of religiously-motivated 
opinions.  Gaynor had publicised comments on social media highly critical of the army’s 
gender inclusive policies, and of one senior transgender officer in particular. Like Ms Banerji 
in Comcare v Banerji he complained that the decision taken by his government employer (this 
time under the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) reg 85(1)(d)) to terminate his 
commission infringed the implied constitutional freedom of political  communication.102  He 
succeeded at first instance upon a finding that he had made his media comments as a ‘private 
citizen’, and ‘in a personal capacity unconnected with the ADF except by the ongoing formal 
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circumstance of ADF membership’.103 In a unanimous judgment, the Federal Court full bench 
overturned this decision, and held that although the Chief of Army’s exercise of the discretion 
under reg 85 to terminate his commission did operate to restrict Gaynor’s political 
expression,104 it nevertheless met the requirements of the second limb of the Lange test.105  The 
Lange test, from Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,106 requires consideration of 
two limbs. The first limb asks whether the law in question does restrict political expression.  If 
so, the second limb asks whether the restriction is nevertheless consistent with preservation of 
the integrity of Australia’s constitutional system of representative and responsible government.  
Applying the second limb involves assessing whether the law is suitable to meeting its purpose, 
necessary (in that no less restrictive measure might achieve the purpose), and balanced or 
proportionate, meaning that the benefits gained must outweigh any harm caused.107  In this 
case, the purpose of reg 85 was to permit the Defence Forces to maintain discipline among 
personnel, and to ensure that officers were persons of suitable character.108 Gaynor had shown 
himself to be unsuitable because of his ‘lack of tolerance and respect for fellow officers’, and 
his persistent disobedience of a lawful command not to make such comments while identifying 
himself as a member of the Australian Defence Forces.109  Exercise of the discretion in reg 85 
to terminate his commission was held to be a proportionate response, given the extreme 
intransigence of his conduct. 
Gaynor had also raised an argument based on the Australian Constitution (s 116), 
because he claimed a religious motivation for his disrespectful communications. Section 116 
provides that ‘[t]he Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for 
imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no 
religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the 
Commonwealth.’ To this argument, the full bench responded: ‘Absent perhaps some arguments 
based on unlawful discrimination, an officer . . .  cannot rely on his religious beliefs as an 
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excuse for disobeying lawful orders and directions from his superiors, even if . . . it had been 
proven that those beliefs compelled or necessitated the conduct under question.’110 
The concept of proportionality also informs decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) when it is considering contests between conflicting rights in an employment 
context. A set of four cases which went on appeal from courts in the United Kingdom to the 
ECHR demonstrate that even the constitutional protection under the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘Convention’) of a fundamental 
human right to express one’s religious views can still be constrained by the competing demands 
of an employer’s business and the well-being of other co-workers, so long as the constraints 
imposed by the employer protect a legitimate interest in a proportionate manner. Eweida and 
Ors v The United Kingdom (‘Eweida and Ors)111 considered four complaints from plaintiffs 
who had been unsuccessful before United Kingdom courts and tribunals. Two concerned 
employees who claimed to have been discriminated against in their employment because they 
insisted on wearing a necklace bearing a cross, to signify their Christian faith. One, Ms Eweida, 
was successful in her claim, because a majority of the court found that the employer’s uniform 
policy was not essential to the employer’s business interests, and in any event the employer 
had ultimately been willing to alter it.112   
The second case concerned a nurse, Ms Chaplin, who, like Ms Eweida, insisted on 
wearing her cross on a necklace while on duty, and refused to cooperate with suggestions that 
she instead wear it under clothing, or as a brooch, so that it would not create any potential risk 
to patient safety.  The ECHR determined that while her employer’s refusal to allow her to 
remain in her post while wearing the cross was ‘an interference with her freedom to manifest 
her religion,’113 the ‘protection of health and safety on a hospital ward’ was a legitimate reason 
to limit her freedom, and the means adopted were not disproportionate.114 
The second two cases concerned employees who conscientiously objected to some of 
the duties required of their jobs, on religious grounds. Ms Ledele worked as a civil marriage 
celebrant for the London Borough of Islington. She was a Christian who held the belief that 
same-sex civil partnerships were ‘contrary to God’s law’.115 So when the Civil Partnership Act 
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2004 (UK) came into force, she refused to conduct civil partnerships between same-sex 
couples, and claimed that her right to manifest her religious beliefs should entitle her to opt out 
of these duties.  Other civil celebrants employed by Islington complained of the rostering 
difficulties she was creating by refusing certain duties, and some gay colleagues also 
complained that they felt victimised by her stance.116 She was ultimately dismissed from her 
employment. In this case, while the ECHR held that the local authority had discriminated 
against her on grounds of her religious belief, it was held to have done so in the pursuit of a 
legitimate ‘policy aimed to secure the rights of others which are also protected under the 
Convention’, namely the rights of gay couples.117 The majority found in the UK’s favour, on 
the basis that ‘[t]he court generally allows the national authorities a wide margin of 
appreciation when it comes to striking a balance between competing Convention rights.’118  
Judges Vucinic and De Gaetano wrote a strongly worded dissenting opinion in Ms 
Ladele’s case. They distinguished this as a case of freedom of ‘conscience’ rather than freedom 
of religion, and described Ms Ladele as a victim of ‘backstabbing’ colleagues, and a ‘blinkered 
political correctness of the Borough of Islington (which clearly favoured “gay rights” over 
fundamental human rights)’.119 The tone of the dissenting judgment in this matter indicates 
how vexed these kinds of contests between competing claims can be. It might be argued that 
the dissenting judges themselves used offensively non-inclusive language in their published 
reasons, referring as they did to ‘gay rights’ in quotation marks, as if such rights were 
questionable. 
The fourth case was of Mr McFarlane, a social worker employed with a private, not-
for-profit company that provided psycho-sexual counselling to couples. Like Ms Ledele, he 
was a Christian who believed that homosexuality was sinful. He was not prepared to give his 
employer an unqualified commitment that he would provide therapy to same-sex couples if 
called upon to do so, so he was dismissed. The ECHR held that the employer’s action was 
justified because it was ‘intended to secure the implementation of its policy of providing a 
service without discrimination’.120 
In each of the three cases in which the UK succeeded (Chaplin, Ladele and McFarlane), 
the employer was able to demonstrate a legitimate interest related to their own objectives – in 
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avoiding risk to patient care (Chaplin), and providing non-discriminatory services to the 
community (Ladele and McFarlane). While each matter was held to have involved 
discrimination on the basis of the manifestation of religious belief, these three cases were held 
to be justified, on the basis of the employer’s legitimate interest, reasonably protected by 
proportionate means.  
In addition, there have been a number of pertinent cases decided by the UK 
Employment Tribunal where individuals expressing contentious views have sought to 
challenge actions taken by their employer.  Maya Forestater worked as a visiting fellow and 
consultant for a think tank in the international development sphere.  She alleged that the 
relationship came to an end and she was not offered any more work because of her view that 
sex is immutable, whatever the person’s stated gender identity or gender expression.121   Other 
staff working for the respondent raised concerns that Ms Forestater’s comments and public 
tweets to the effect that ‘transwomen are men’, as well as her insistence on calling people by 
the sex she considered appropriate, were offensive and transphobic.   The matter was dealt with 
not by way of a full hearing, but as a prehearing to determine a number of preliminary issues.  
One of those issues was whether the belief relied on by the claimant qualified as a 
‘philosophical belief’ pursuant to the protections for religion or belief under the Equality Act 
2010 (UK) s 10. She did not surmount this hurdle because the UK Employment tribunal found 
that her view, ‘in its absolutist nature, is incompatible with human dignity and the fundamental 
rights of others’.122 The tribunal went on to state that ‘[e]ven paying due regard to the qualified 
right to freedom of expression, people cannot expect to be protected if their core belief involves 
violating others’ dignity and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for them.’123 
In a similar vein, Dr Mackereth unsuccessfully sought to challenge the termination of 
his employment for breaching his employer’s policy that required all employees to use the 
personal pronoun preferred by the client being assessed, regardless of the client’s biological 
sex.124  The employer’s evidence was that the policy was designed with the legitimate purpose 
of seeking to ensure that transgender clients were treated with respect. The employer argued 
that Dr Mackereth’s views should not be recognised as a belief worthy of protection, because 
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at the heart of those beliefs was an intolerance towards transgender people.  The tribunal found 
that Dr Mackereth’s refusal to refer to transgender clients’ preferred pronouns, titles or styles 
would constitute unlawful discrimination or harassment under the Equality Act.125 The tribunal 
found that his biblically-based objection to transgenderism similarly did not pass the requisite 
test for a protectable belief as it was incompatible with human dignity and conflicted with the 
fundamental rights of others.126  
We see from this small sample of cases from other jurisdictions that the concept of 
proportionality and balance is fundamental to resolution of claims when competing value-
systems come into conflict.   
V A FAIR WORK COMMISSION BASED SOLUTION  
We have argued that the general approach to dispute resolution in the unfair dismissal and 
workplace bullying jurisdictions of the Fair Work Commission is preferable to the General 
Protections or discrimination law approach.  There are aspects of both these jurisdictions that 
are worth considering in terms of fashioning a legislative scheme to deal with issues 
surrounding religious freedoms at work.  We view this as a better way forward than trying to 
introduce special protections into anti-discrimination legislation for those who engage in 
discriminatory actions or expression based on their religious beliefs.  Anti-discrimination 
legislation by its very nature is concerned with protections from discrimination, rather than 
establishing the right to engage in discriminatory conduct or expression.   The workplace 
bullying provisions in the Fair Work Act are an example of the crafting of a specific legislative 
regime to address a discrete workplace problem.  It is a regime that seeks to balance the right 
of workers to complain about their treatment at work with the ability of employers to undertake 
reasonable disciplinary action.  There are advantages to taking this type of targeted approach 
to dealing with a particular type of problem at work – in this case the conflicts that arise over 
the clash of competing interests where religious freedoms are exercised at work.  However, 
one of the drawbacks of this scheme is that it only operates while the employment relationship 
is on foot and offers a remedy in those circumstances to bring any alleged bullying to an end.  
Where an applicant has felt unable to remain in that place of employment or had their 
employment terminated ,  the workplace bullying jurisdiction offers no remedy.   
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In those circumstances, access to a jurisdiction that looks to the harshness, justice and 
reasonableness of that termination is required.  But as we outlined earlier, eligibility criteria 
and compensation caps in the existing unfair dismissal jurisdiction present problems for the 
wider availability of access to some form of timely resolution that offers appropriate 
compensation for the loss suffered.  Hence, it was not the avenue of choice for applicants such 
as Folau or Rumble.  In response, we suggest that  eligibility to bring a claim  should be open 
to all employees and not limited by the present eligibility requirements. As provisions dealing 
with discrimination on the basis of fundamental human rights recognised in Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, they would be underpinned by the 
external affairs power in the Constitution and so need not be limited by any constitutional 
constraints.  There should be no requirement for any minimum period of employment, or for 
the employee’s salary to fall below any income threshold. There should also be no cap on 
orders for compensation when compensation is deemed to be the only appropriate remedy, and 
compensatory orders should be permitted to include recognition of distress, hurt and 
humiliation, given that these kinds of harm will be common in these kinds of matters because 
they involve contests over deeply personal convictions and identities.  
As in the case of both General Protections and workplace bullying complaints,  applications 
should be permitted, and indeed encouraged, to be made prior to termination of employment, 
so that there is scope to repair and preserve relationships.  The Fair Work Commission needs 
a discretion to make appropriate orders from the range it currently applies in both unfair 
dismissal and workplace bullying complaints, and should be empowered to make these orders 
against applicants as well as respondents, so that an outspoken employee can be directed to 
modify their communications or adjust their conduct to accommodate the interests of co-
workers or their employer’s legitimate interest in maintaining business reputation and 
relationships.  
 Critics may complain that this solution would give the Fair Work Commission too much 
power to interfere in the management of workplaces. We would argue that the Commission 
already wields considerable influence through its unfair dismissal and workplace bullying 
jurisdictions. Moreover, the Fair Work Commission is a forum solely dedicated to resolving 
issues at work, and its ability to offer timely access to forms of negotiated dispute resolution 
(for example, set at 14 days initially for a bullying claim) makes it well placed to resolve these 
workplace problems expeditiously where possible.  Finally, this article has exposed problems 
with using legal avenues such as the Fair Work Act’s General Protections due to the restrictive 
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interpretations adopted by courts.   At the same time, the federal unfair dismissal jurisdiction 
imposes eligibility criteria that restricts access to certain classes of employees, and a 
compensation cap that limits the effectiveness of pecuniary remedies  These criticisms of the 
enforcement of General Protections, and the scope of the unfair dismissal jurisdiction raise 
broader questions of reform, beyond  our concern with the particular need for a system of 
redress for individuals complaining that their personal freedoms have been constrained at work.  
 
VI CONCLUSIONS  
Our concern in this article has been to contribute a pragmatic solution to the current debate 
about the appropriate means of protecting employees’ rights to free expression of their religious 
views without jeopardising their job security.  At the heart of the debate is the question of 
where the line must be drawn between employees’ freedom of expression, and employers’ 
interests in protecting their own business reputations and promoting harmony in diverse 
workplaces.  Sometimes, the employer’s own ‘mission statements’, values and ‘brands’ will 
have been influenced by the same social norms expressed in anti-discrimination statutes, such 
as the obligation to provide an inclusive work environment.  Similarly, employers’ attempts to 
manage these commitments through codes of conduct may be motivated by a concern to avoid 
vicarious liability for harm inflicted by some employees on others. 
When secular employers make a case for an entitlement to manage these kinds of issues, 
they are asking for nothing more than religious organisations already enjoy in the form of an 
exemption from liability under the Fair Work Act s 351.  Section 351(2)(c) permits religious 
organisations to defend otherwise discriminatory conduct on the basis that they are acting to 
protect their own belief systems.127  Presently, only faith-based institutions enjoy this privilege. 
A purely humanistic organisation, committed only to the promotion of respect, mutual 
tolerance and kindness among all people here on earth, would have no claim to exclude people 
from employment who expressed antagonism to and undermined those values on the basis of 
some alternative political or religious commitment. Rugby Australia, as a secular organisation 
with its own values and convictions, can raise no defence under s 351(2)(c).  
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The question now facing Australian policy-makers is whether further legislation is 
needed to alter the present balance of our laws in this respect. As we have sought to demonstrate 
in Part 2 above, the Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 would produce further constraints on 
secular employers’ capacity to manage these issues, and in our view these proposals are best 
left undone. 
Whether Australia really needs more robust protections for employees’ claims to 
religious and political freedom remains a difficult question. Cases in which employees’ 
expression of religious views have no bearing on their capacity to perform their duties at work 
are easy. ‘The common law right of an employee is to . . .  act as [s]he chooses, in matters not 
affecting his [or her] work’.128 But what of a case where sponsors and customers of the 
employer take umbrage at the employees’ conduct, and seek to punish the employer by 
withdrawal of business, as (allegedly) occurred in the Folau matter?  Must an employing 
organisation be required to risk insolvency as a consequence of being forced to continue paying 
the salaries of staff whose public statement undermine the revenue base of the organisation? In 
an age where consumers often select products and services based on value-laden brand 
identities, the highly publicised religious views of people associated with a company can 
potentially affect sales.  
As we have explained above, the immediate financial impact on an employer’s business 
is not the only issue at stake in these cases. Employers owe a duty of care to all of their 
employees. As the small sample of UK cases noted above demonstrates, some freedoms are 
inherently diametrically opposed.  An employer respecting its duty of care towards LGBTIQ+ 
staff may well face an unavoidable conflict of duties if it is also required to tolerate without 
correction the blistering expression of anti-gay views by their religiously devout colleagues.   
In our view, statements of belief that do not respect the human rights and dignity of others 
ought not to be shielded from the consequences of protective human rights laws.  In addition, 
a better process for dealing with these kinds of contests may very well be the processes of 
conciliation and arbitration managed by the Fair Work Commission. An approach to dispute 
resolution that respects proportionality and balance in addressing competing interests is likely 
to provide more acceptable solutions than litigious processes. There is great merit in the 
idiosyncratically Australian ‘fair go all round’ approach to resolving disputes over workplace 
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claims and in charging the already experienced Fair Work Commission with managing such a 
system.    
 
 
 
 
 
